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COMMENTARY
STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES: CONSTITUTIONALITY,
COMMUNITY, AND HERESY
LymAN JOHNSON*

The student writers of the following Note' have asked me to address
the topic of state takeover legislation. I do so both to extend the constitutional debate concerning takeover statutes to a third form of takeover
statute that the Note does not discuss-the business combination statuteand to place the entire subject into a somewhat larger perspective. My
comments are brief.
In 1982 the United States Supreme Court struck down the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act in Edgar v. MITE Corp.2 Ironically, that decision
was probably the best thing that ever happened to state takeover statutes.
It caused a fundamental rethinking of the basis for state intervention in
takeover battles and led to a radical shift in the legislative program of
takeover opponents; a program apparently vindicated in 1987 when the
Supreme Court upheld Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions Act.'
In reaction to the MITE decision states adopted a brilliant strategy:
place takeover laws into general corporate statutes. This approach to takeover regulation had two advantages. First, lodging takeover laws in a larger
body of law that states unquestionably were authorized to formulate-the
body of law governing corporate "internal affairs"-was perceived to
immunize them from constitutional attack. Second, existing corporate statutes already were decidedly pro-management and, thus, takeover laws could
be fitted into a pre-existing regulatory regime without need for more overt
state action of the kind overturned in MITE.
As made clear by the following student Note, there is little question
after CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America that two relatively mild
sorts of second-generation takeover statutes are above constitutional re4
proach: the control share acquisition statutes and the fair price statutes.
More intriguing is the constitutional status of a far more potent form of
legislation, the "business combination" statute pioneered by New York.5
This kind of statute has been adopted, with variations, by several other

* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law. B.A. 1973, Carleton
College; J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota.
1. See Note, "May We Have the Last Dance?" States Take Aim at CorporateRaiders
and Crash the Predator'sBall, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1059 (1988).
2. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
3. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
4. Of course, those statutes that apply to foreign corporations remain suspect.
5. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 912 (McKinney 1986).
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states, most notably Delaware. 6 As with control share and fair price legislation, business combination statutes follow the "corporate law" approach
to takeover regulation. Also, as with fair price legislation, such statutes do
not directly regulate the tender offer process as such. Rather, they operate
post-takeover by prohibiting a successful bidder from causing the acquired
target company to engage in statutorily-defined "business combinations"
for several years unless target management assents. While in form operating
only after a takeover has succeeded, the obvious purpose of these statutes,
as with all antitakeover legislation, is to deter takeovers in the first instance.
They do so by discouraging would-be bidders from pursuing companies
whose assets cannot be drawn on to pay off the staggering acquisition
indebtedness incurred to accomplish many of today's takeover transactions.
In short, the hope is that the post-acquisition moratorium will, ex ante,
create a substantial disincentive to the initial launching of takeover bids.
Obviously, one important question is whether such a statute is constitutional under the reasoning of CTS. As to preemption by the Williams
Act, Justice Powell's opinion in CTS fudged an important point that is
central to resolving the constitutional status of business combination statutes:
Does the Williams Act mandate that shareholders possess the critical decisionmaking authority on takeover issues? A plurality of Justices in MITE
believed that state bureaucrats may not hold such authority, while the Court
in CTS held that shareholders as a group may possess that power. But what
about target management itself? May states assign the pivotal decisionmaking role in takeovers to those very persons the bidder is seeking to displace?
7
In subscribing to the oft-cited but little-explained "policy of neutrality,"
a plurality in MITE adopted what might be called a "shareholder autonomy" reading of the Williams Act - i.e., that under the Williams Act
individual shareholders ought to decide basic stock disposition questions.
In short, attention is focused on the process by which takeover contests are
resolved. In CTS Justice Powell expressly refrained from adopting or
rejecting that reading of the Williams Act. Instead, he evaluated the Indiana
statute by gauging how it fulfilled what might be called the larger, more
substantive "investor protection" goals of the Williams Act. Once a takeover
bid had been launched the Indiana statute appeared to address the problem
of coercion inherent in partial and two-tiered tender offers-two exceedingly
rare species of bid today-and also empowered shareholders as a group
(although not individually). Consequently, the Court concluded that the
statute was consistent with investor well-being. Missing from Powell's analysis was any discussion of whether such protection for shareholders actually
receiving a takeover bid had been achieved at too high a price. That is
whether, ex ante, shareholders as a class might be damaged by the statute
because it reduces the aggregate level of takeover activity by creating too
great a disincentive for bidders.
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1988).
7. For a detailed critique of the current controversy over Williams Act preemption, see
Johnson and Millon, Misreading The Williams Act (forthcoming).
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Because Delaware's corporate jurisprudence-both statutory and common-law-long has entrusted corporate management, as fiduciaries, to "protect" the interests of investors, it is logical that Delaware's takeover statute
similarly would entrust not bureaucrats or fellow shareholders but management itself to "protect" investor interests in takeovers. Must that cardinal
tenet of state corporate law yield to avoid preemption by the MITE
plurality's "shareholder autonomy" reading of the Williams Act, or can
Delaware's paternalistic approach to investor protection be fitted into Justice
Powell's end-oriented and more substantive notion of "investor protection?"
In three 1988 decisions the Federal District Court of Delaware, after
much hand-wringing, upheld the Delaware statute against constitutional
challenge.8 The court emphasized the apparent substantive advantages of
management involvement for investor well-being and, somewhat at odds
therewith, the "meaningful" ability of shareholders themselves to resolve
takeover contests notwithstanding management opposition. In essence, the
Court read the Williams Act as requiring at least enough shareholder say
in takeovers to overcome a management veto. To that extent, the Act is
viewed as adopting, or at least assuming the existence of, a process component.
At about the same time, a Wisconsin federal judge, in a decision later
withdrawn when the case was settled, struck down the Wisconsin business
combination statute on the process-oriejited "shareholder autonomy" rationale of the MITE plurality. 9 He believed that management involvement
in the takeover decisionmaking process of the kind provided for in the
Wisconsin business combination statute was formidable and therefore antithetical to the Williams Act conception of investor protection. Accordingly,
the Wisconsin statute was preempted. This issue undoubtedly will be revisited
in other states and, because it goes to the very heart of the question of
how states may use their corporate statutes to allocate decisionmaking power
in corporate takeovers, it is likely to require resolution by the Supreme
Court.
While the constitutionality of state takeover legislation is of obvious
importance, it is, in a sense, only a threshold* issue. Suppose that the
business combination statute, and even more robust forms of takeover
legislation as undoubtedly will follow in its wake, are constitutional. Then
the question-a far more interesting question-is whether those statutes will
succeed in accomplishing their objectives. What exactly are those objectives?
Even though some commentators still defend state takeover statutes on
shareholder protection grounds, 10 by now that ruse is largely over. The
8. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,730 (D. Del. April 1, 1988); R. P. Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-88
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,763 (D. Del. May 9, 1988); City Capital
Assocs. v. Interco, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,079 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 1988).
9. RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., Unpublished Memorandum Decision and Order, No.
88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
10. See, e.g., Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. Rav. 1635
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statutes are not primarily aimed at enhancing the wealth or governance
position of nonresident shareholders, but at preserving intact the corporate
ecosystem of resident companies. From both a political and an economic
standpoint, it makes a great deal of sense for states to prefer the interests
of those various noninvestor constituents who vote and directly contribute
to their economies over those persons - i.e., nonresident shareholderswho have a much weaker connection to the state. As I have argued
elsewhere, I believe current state efforts will fail to accomplish their primary
objectives. Accordingly, simply passing constitutional muster is of little
significance if the larger efficacy of the legislative enterprise is in doubt.
Still, in spite of their probable failure, state efforts to deploy their corporate
statutes to protect noninvestor interests warrant serious reflection for two
reasons.
First, state takeover statutes are an attempt by states to assert some
influence over the manner in which the inanimate "market for corporate
control" plays itself out on the lives of their citizens. These attempts often
are dismissed out of hand as "quaint," "misguided," or "smacking of
parochialism." At the limit, even genuine good faith efforts to attain a
greater measure of economic self-sufficiency must also be so labeled. In
other words, frankly to disdain the gravity and speed of change wrought
on local economies by highly-developed, almost frenetic capital markets is
not only a sure precursor to proposing supposedly unconstitutional burdens
on interstate commerce, but also to be extraordinarily unenlightened. The
progeny of Sinclair Lewis' Carol Kennicott and George Babbit must awaken
and divine the path of Progress. They must flee the suffocating air of the
hinterlands and be "redeployed" in more invigorating climes.
If indeed local and regional economies are to be rescued from the
miasma of place and continually "disciplined" by the rigors of the national
and international capital markets, one wonders with Wendell Berry whether
authentic community is still possible-authentic in the sense of being more
than what we call people who live in close proximity to one another. 2 Can
there be genuine community in the sense of a place that is central to its
own inhabitants' well-being without also having local, even somewhat selfsufficient economic endeavor? If true community depends on economic
health, then a relentless buffeting of local economies may do little for
communal well-being. It would be ironic if, in trumpeting the. virtues of
unchecked market solutions, those persons who politically distrust centralized political power and favor its dispersion serve to undercut the economic
roots of geopolitical diversity and viability. 3 It is odd that the antidote for

(1988) For a response, see Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes,
87 MICH. L. Ray.
- (forthcoming 1989).
11. Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target
Management Conduct, 14 J. Corn,. L. 35 (1988).
12. W. BERRY, Does Community Have a Value?, in HomE EcONOWCs 179 (1987).
13. For a discussion of how a desire to control political power through decentralization
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excessive or misguided public political power is private economic power that
itself alters the political and cultural fabric in ways that only accelerate the
call for public intervention of the kind evidenced by state takeover laws.
Traditionally, conservatism has meant more than a strong preference
for the private sector as a counterpoise to the public sphere. It also has
been keenly protective of institutions such as family, church, and local
communities as vibrant sources of energy and influence. Today, the latter
component of conservatism seems threatened by a preference for the private
sphere and the imperative of economics. A vision of diversity and pluralism,
even a measure of insularity, gives way to one of transcendent interconnectedness and convergence. If not a world polity or community, some
seem to say, then why not, at least a world market-place? In response to
this, is it illicit for a community to turn a bit inward, and to establish its
own good as the standard by which it changes rather than responding solely
to "forces, originating outside itself, that did not consider, much less desire,
' 4
the welfare or the existence of such communities[?]' 1
Conversely, as economic forces erase state and national borders, what
continued purpose is served by political boundaries and the even more
ineffable social boundaries of locale? Do we substitute for the traditional,
deep-seated claims of place and all that entails some hard-to-muster allegiance to an authoritative abstraction called the national or world economy?
Is the notion of "national community" itself somewhat of a distortion, and
a recent one at that, as Professor Nisbet suggests; an intellectual fiction
necessary for legitimizing the world-shrinking developments in technology
and commerce? "5Of necessity, when economic forces so quickly can traverse
political and cultural boundaries, old-fashioned "off the books" virtues
such as neighborliness, charity, rootedness, and abiding loyalty are forced
to yield to more measurable, supposedly neutral and uncontroversial qualities
encapsulated by the principle of "efficiency." Perhaps the appeal of a
notion like efficiency is its very "thinness," its happy ability to mask how
differently people from varying places and backgrounds view the world.
Whether that is for the good, or even possible to resist, seems a question
worth lingering over from more perspectives than the economist's. For now,
the universal rhetoric of markets seeks to silence other vernaculars.
The second reason to reflect on state efforts to protect noninvestor
interests is that in addition to saying something about what the populace
at large expects of corporate endeavor, state takeover statutes also are a
real burden for corporate scholars. Up until the 1960's corporate law was
plagued by a deeply-embedded problem. It presumed that in a capitalist
society corporate endeavor primarily was directed toward maximizing the

of economic power motivated the Sherman Act of 1890, see Millon, The Sherman Act and
the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219 (1988).
14. Berry, supra note 11, at 183-84.
15. See Nisbet, The PresentAge and the State of Community, CHRONICLES, June, 1988,
at 11.
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welfare of capital-providing shareiolders, and that other important societal
interests were more or less congruent with that objective. Corporate statutes
were designed along the lines of a democratic polity in which shareholderconstituents elected their director-representatives. The common law also
regarded directors as fiduciaries for the "corporation and its shareholders,"
insisting, at least in theory, that management channel its awesome power
toward achieving the good of others-the shareholders.
Notwithstanding the premises and design of the corporate law regime,
many reluctantly believed that in fact management held the upper hand,
and that the legal edifice was a bit of a hoax. Into this dilemma came
hostile takeovers and the larger market-oriented view of corporations that
we now know so well. This phenomenon breathed fresh life into corporate
law, producing an entirely new conception of the director-shareholder
relationship and mending the embarrassing rift between theory and practice.
If legal "rules" could not effectively constrain management discretion and
preserve shareholder primacy, then various markets could; including, most
notably, capital markets and the market for corporate control.
Dereliction by corporate management would be reflected in a corporation's stock price and would afford an opportunity for profit to someone
who believed that he could put corporate resources to better use. The
passageway to corporate assets is the capital markets where, for a premium,
a controlling stock interest can be acquired. Thus, in one fell swoop the
tenets of economic and legal orthodoxy are preserved and shareholders are
returned to a central place on the corporate stage. Shareholders fortunate
enough to own stock in target companies are enriched directly, while other
shareholders realize gain from the renewed vigilance that the threat of
takeover draws from corporate managers. And too, society at large benefits
or, more properly, its interest in an "efficient" use of economic resources
supposedly is served. Social welfare is equated with that which can be

measured. 16
States that "corrupt" their corporate statutes by consciously deploying
them to deter market forces such as hostile takeovers for the good of local
communities and resident noninvestors upset this tidy scheme, and such
actions are, in a word, heretical. After all, some would say, corporate law
relationship
is and always has been only about the shareholder-management
7
and it fastidiously has eschewed other concerns.'
One response then is to drive such concerns-typified by a modern
takeover statute-from corporate law, restoring it to its former state of
conceptual purity. One significant incident of this vision of corporate law
is to embrace, at least implicitly, the larger social and political repercussions

16. For one critique of the limitations of the contractual and market-centered model of
corporate law, see Fox, The Role of the Market Model in CorporateLaw Analysis: A Comment
on Weiss and White, 76 CALn . L. REv. 1015 (1988).
17. For a description of corpor'ate law in an earlier day, see Millon, State Takeover
Laws: A Rebirth of CorporationLaw, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 903 (1988); Johnson, supra
note 10, at 27-29.

1988]

STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

1057

felt in local communities as capital market forces drive corporate action.
Another response is not to worry about such laws because state efforts will
fail anyway, and are best forgotten as an unfortunate aberration. A third
response is to ask whether twentieth century corporate law has been too
narrowly conceived; whether because there are certain phenomena of which
it gives no good account it consciously chooses to ignore them and focus
on "maximization of shareholder welfare" as its sole and authoritative
marker.
Perhaps the narrowed realm of concern is quite sensible and bespeaks
a commendable modesty of ambition. On the other hand, maybe its rendition
of corporate activity is simply incomplete, a point flushed out by the
takeover controversy. The pages of intellectual history are filled with instances of discarded world views-one thinks of Newtonian mechanics and
pre-Darwinian biology; those temporary orderings of physical and social
phenomena that were displaced by richer, more inclusive (but also imperfect)
paradigms.
State takeover statutes thus raise the question of whether the entire
corporate industry-the laws that shape and regulate it, those who govern
business entities, and-those who counsel participants and affected partiesought to operate wholly within such a narrow and rigid conception of
corporate endeavor with its elevation of events on unfettered capital markets
as the content-less touchstone of collective enterprise. Or alternatively,
whether some actors are entitled to say "no" and begin, however poorly
at first, to rechart a different course. These questions might usefully be
taken up by larger segments of communities, and be grappled with by
persons from outside the now highly-rarified mode of discourse on corporate
matters. These questions go well beyond the issue of constitutionality.

